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This paper analyzes patterns of tips, gifts and bribes paid by patients for health care ser-
vices. Informal payments are more prevalent in developing and transition countries
because the economic and socio-cultural environment is more conducive to “gifts”-ex-
change as a means to maintain the underfunded health care system. Moreover, most
Eastern European countries have experienced wider socio-political reforms, which have
also affected health care service provision and have led to a greater reliance on informal
patient payments in the access and quality assurance of health care services. This study
provides evidence on public attitudes and recent experiences with informal patient pay-
ments in post-Soviet and post-communist countries, namely in Lithuania, Ukraine and
Poland. The empirical results suggest a lower share of informal patient payments as well as
a prevalence of more negative attitudes towards informal patient payments in Poland
compared to Lithuania and Ukraine. Informal payments are more common and more
expensive for in-patient health care services in contrast to out-patient ones in all countries.
Still, in post-Soviet Lithuania and Ukraine informal patient payments co-exist with other
types of patient payments such as quasi-formal patient payments. When clear regulation
of the basic package and formal patient charges is lacking, patients experience a mixture of
payment obligations. About three quarters of the respondents support the statement that
informal patient payments should be eradicated. It is proposed therefore that governments
of the countries should meet public expectations and implement a strategy to deal with
informal patient payments. In all three countries, informal patient payments (both “bribes
and fees”) are a symptom of system failure and provide a means for patients to obtain the
health care they desire, which the government is not able to guarantee. Suitable regula-
tions coupled with (dis)incentives may decrease the level of informal payments for health
care provision.
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hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.tional University of ‘Kyiv-Mohyla Academy’, Skovorody Street 2, Kiev 04655, Ukraine. Tel./fax: þ380 44
ko), M.Pavlova@maastrichtuniversity.nl (M. Pavlova), Griga@ukma.kiev.ua (I. Gryga), Murauskiene@
rsity.nl (W. Groot).
earch Center, Hanyang University.
nter, Hanyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
T. Stepurko et al. / Journal of Eurasian Studies 6 (2015) 46e58 471. Introduction social life, and in economic and political arrangements
(Berend, 2007). In particular, the health care systems inIn post-communist countries, including post-Soviet
European countries, informal payments given by grateful
patients to health care providers have been observed to
exist since the 1970s (Gaal, 2004; Mossialos, Dixon,
Figueras, & Kutzin, 2002). However, the phenomenon of
informal payments emerged much earlier and existed in
Western European countries as well. In the past, it was
common that patients brought in-kind donations for their
family doctors on a regular basis in order to show thank-
fulness for their work (Adam, 1985, 1986 in Gaal & McKee,
2005; Levene & Sireling, 1980). As Winslow (1946, p. 316)
noticed over sixty years ago, “the tribute from one g.p.
(the grateful patient) to another g.p. (the general practi-
tioner) is a supplement to e not a substitute for e an
assured income”. In Western European countries, the
phenomenon diminished or even disappeared as a result of
a drive towards more transparency, accountability and
control, and greater emphasis on professional norms and
conduct (Bovi, 2003; Stone, 1997; Williams, 2005). Health
care reforms, i.e. most notably the introduction of universal
and generous health insurance systems, which ensured
physicians of a stable and adequate income, also contrib-
uted to that (Bass & Wolfson, 1980; Greenberg, 1990;
Orentlicher, 1994). Meanwhile, informality in the patiente
physician relation ﬂourished in the Soviet context.
Until the 1990s, market regulatory mechanisms such as
negotiable prices and competition were not applied in
communist and Soviet countries due to the existing socio-
political arrangements. Indeed, the low public health care
funding in post-Soviet republics (in the absence of private
spending) led to insufﬁcient health care resources and in-
equalities in access to public services and goods. Hence, a
variety of informal strategies dominated in health care and
other “non-productive” sectors (Ensor, 2004). Indeed,
“blat” (the attainment of public goods through personnel
connections often anchored in long-term social relation-
ships) became a ruling approach in social life and relations
(Ledeneva, 1998; Patico, 2002; Rivkin-Fish, 1997; Salmi,
2003). Because of shortages in goods (rather than money)
during the communist or Soviet period, informal payments
in the form of gifts like perfumes and alcohol, were espe-
cially appreciated in contrast to cash payments. The health
care sector was no exception to the “ideologies of gift ex-
change” (Patico, 2002, p. 346). Similarly to other sectors,
e.g. education, police, courts of justice and custom ofﬁces
(Ledeneva, 2006; Miller, Grødeland, & Koshechkina, 1998),
gifts and barter supported by reliable connections domi-
nated in health care provision. Patients relied on these
strategies mainly to motivate the underpaid health care
staff and to receive extra attention of the staff. However,
certain restraints were perceptible due to the strong pun-
ishment system during the Soviet period (Heinzen, 2007;
Wanner, 2006). Also, when the provider is not interested
in monetary transactions, gifts and favors exchanged and
regulated by complex rules of reciprocity (Granovetter,
2007) may become an important but still rare practice.
In the late 1980s, communist societies started a transi-
tion process that brought drastic changes in social values,post-communist European countries were faced with a
dramatic decrease in public funding despite the signiﬁcant
health care infrastructure and large beneﬁt packages
established during the communist period that were pre-
served. Also, aside from the economic and structural
changes in health care, fundamental changes in the broader
social structure have occurred. In particular, collectivism
with its link to wider social networks gave way to more
individualistic approaches based on monetary capital with
embedded personal connections (Harboe, 2015). After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the state lost its de facto power
in public service provision however de jure most of state's
functions have remained unchanged. In order to ﬁll the gap
between regulatory and actual posture, new structures and
agents e dual by nature (market and informal sector) e
have emerged and have adopted some of the state func-
tions (Williams & Onoschenko, 2014). In an overall climate
of state withdrawal ‘from the provision of protection from
social risks that citizens expect or need’ (Polese, Morris,
Harboe, & Kovacs, 2014) in addition to public skepticism
and distrust to formal institutions, individuals develop
their owne ‘self-help’ or ‘do-it-yourself’e strategies aimed
at obtaining (adequate quality) services (Cohen, 2012;
Mishler & Rose, 1997; Polese et al., 2014).
These changes have affected informal patient payments
in the health care sector as well. During the transition
period, cash informal payments started to play an important
role since they facilitated the maintenance of the living
standards of the health care staff who received them.
Although informal patient payments are not seen as a
transition feature exclusively, the prevalence of informal
payments is thought to be higher in the post-communist
period compared to the past (Gaal, 2004). Therefore, this
paper aims to describe the magnitude and attitudes towards
informal patient payments in post-Soviet and other post-
communist countries. In particular, the peculiarities of
informal patient payments are studied in three Eastern Eu-
ropean countries e post-Soviet Lithuania and post-
communist Poland, both members of the EU, and Ukraine:
a post-Soviet non-EU country. These countries present an
interesting base for a comparisonwith regard to differences
in their socio-economic and political trajectory after
communism. This paper contributes to the literature on
informal patient payments with recent empirical data dis-
cussed from the angle of socio-political changes and reforms
of the health care systems during two last decades. The
paper is organized as follows: after the introduction, some
background information on the understanding of informal
patient payments and on the consequences of informal pa-
tient payments is presented. Then we outline the context of
the two post-Soviet countries (Lithuania and Ukraine) and
post-communist Poland, followed by the methods section
which summarizes the data collection process. After that
recent empirical evidence on the scope and scale of informal
patient payments as well as on the public attitudes towards
informal payment in Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine is pre-
sented. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper by discussing
the key challenges of “gifts and bribes” to health care pro-
viders in post-Soviet countries.
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prevalence and challenges
During the transition period, the terms “under-the-
table”, “envelope” payments but also “bribes” or “corrup-
tion” became common labels for “gratitude” money to
physicians (Kornai, 2000). The literature deﬁnes informal
patient payments as cash or in-kind supplement to the
ofﬁcial payment for health care services (Belli, 2002; Gaal,
Jakab, & Shishkin, 2010) including commodities, such as
pharmaceuticals and materials (Gaal, Belli, McKee, &
Szocska, 2006; Lewis, 2000). A huge variety in the nature
and patterns of informal patient payments is reported
across countries. Previous studies have provided evidence
on the variation of payment types (cash or in kind gifts given
by patients or their families), timing (before, after or during
service provision), subject (out- or in-patient service),
purpose (obtaining better quality or access), andmotivation
(physician's request or patient's initiative) (Balabanova &
McKee, 2002; Belli, Gotsadze, & Shahriari, 2004; Cockcroft
et al., 2008; Delcheva, Balabanova, & McKee, 1997; Ensor,
2004; Falkingham, Akkazieva, & Baschieri, 2010; Gaal &
McKee, 2005; Lewis, 2002; Shishkin et al., 2003; Tediosi,
Aye, Ibodova, Thompson, & Wyss, 2008; Thompson &
Witter, 2000). Informal patient payments include contri-
butions to publicly-funded health care providers. Typically,
the following patterns of under-the-table payments are
observed: (a) expensive cash ex-ante payments paid for in-
patient care, e.g. surgery or childbirth, whichwere expected
by provider; (b) ex-post gifts in kind of a symbolic value
given to out-patient care providers and initiated by the
patient; (c) moderate payments initiated by the patient in
order to improve health care service attributes and a variety
of other combinations (Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Belli
et al., 2004; Shishkin et al., 2003). Although the existence
of informal payments is publicly known, the speciﬁc
informal transaction takes place in secret without divulging
details (Cohen, 2012). Still, the level and incidence of
informal payments are difﬁcult to compare across countries
because of different methodological approaches used, as
well as differences in the timing of data collection.
Seeing informal payments as purely related to culture
and morality a narrow perspective. It does not fully explain
the variety of informal payments. For example, payments
solicited by staff do not solely reﬂect unethical behavior by
the health care providers but also situations of chronic
underfunding. Indeed consumers cannot avoid informal
payments when in need of acute care.
Furthermore, country-level patient payment policies
have a great impact on the scope and scale of informal
payments. Indeed, informal practices are of a different
magnitude and importance in countries with a similar cul-
tural context but with distinct policies and manner of
implementation. An example of a policy which has a great
impact on the scale of informal payments is the ofﬁcial
patient payment policy. Informal payments for health care
services are of an unregistered and hidden nature and
comprise all unofﬁcial patient payments for publicly-
funded health care services. They are examined as a type
of out-of-pocket payments. However, two other types of
out-of-pocket payments e formal and quasi-formalpayments e refer to ofﬁcial patient charges for public and
private health care services that may accompany informal
patient payments (Belli, 2002; Thompson &Witter, 2000).
In particular, formal payments are regulated by national
legislation while quasi-formal payments are set by the
health care provider in the absence of clear government
regulations. Compared to formal and quasi-formal charges,
informal patient payments claimmore attention as ignoring
these payments causes an underestimation of total health
care expenditure and as their hidden nature imposes a great
challenge to health care provision in terms of accessibility,
accountability and transparency. Still, informal patient
payments are not always perceived as illegal (Ensor, 2004;
Gaal et al., 2006; Lewis, 2000) especially when the legisla-
tion and codes of ethics (even the moral codes) in the
country do not prescribe proper conduct and behavior.
Also, regulation andmonitoring of gift-accepting or gift-
denying behavior of providers may strengthen profession-
alism and therefore make service provision more trans-
parent. Studies show that informal patient payments are
not unique to post-Soviet and post-communist countries.
They are awell-knownphenomenon around theworld. The
practice of small gifts (ﬂowers, chocolates, wine) given by
the thankful patient to health care staff after service pro-
vision exists in many countries (Abbasi & Gadit, 2008; Barr,
1996; Chiu, Smith, Morlock, & Wissow, 2007; Lyckholm,
1998). Such gifts are not typically expected by providers
and the amount and quality of the treatment patients
receive is not dependent on it. Although it is recognized
that such gifts should be regulated and monitored, they are
not seen as a problem in health care provision (Dodge,
1978; Greenberg, 1990; Orentlicher, 1994) as long as pa-
tients who do not give gifts, are not deprived from adequate
health care services. Rubin (2012) even argues that such
small gifts to physicians should not be forbidden since gift
refusal may hurt the feelings of the patient. Therefore, in
exceptional cases, medical professionals have asserted their
right to accept small gifts from patients. Still, these excep-
tional cases of informal exchanges between patient and
medical doctor exist in the context of strong norms and
regulations which shape staff behavior.
Overall, the boundaries between forms of informal
payments e between true gifts that are perceived posi-
tively and solicited payments which have negative and
harmful connotation, e.g. bribes e are blurred (Polese,
2008; Wanner, 2006). In contrast to other services (e.g.
hairdresser), health care service users are usually less
informed about the care that they need and the costs
associated with it. In the case of no formal patient charges,
there is no agreed price-list and it is rare that a payment is
directly requested by the physician. The context in which
informal payments occur is rather ambiguous. Patients are
typically aware of the possibility or need to pay to the
physician but unlike the physicians, patients are usually
inexperienced in ‘ensuring adequate service provision’
through informal payments. Indeed, informal payments are
conducted in a trustful relation, in a speciﬁc atmosphere.
The ability to recognize a hint or a good moment for pay-
ment is desirable to achieve a satisfactory result.
Meanwhile, there are more elements that facilitate a
division of the wheat from the chaff. Speciﬁc local norms
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corruption. However, for post-Soviet countries, corruption
is a relatively new concept (Rose-Ackerman, 2010) which
supplemented a list of well-known phenomena, i.e. bribery,
patronage and pilferage (Werner, 2000). Meanwhile, dis-
cussions about variations in the meaning and in-
terpretations of corruption are highly relevant when the
ranking of countries with different connotation of corrup-
tion, is on the agenda. A negative connotation of corruption
is mostly indisputable, and perceptions of informal ‘fee-for-
service’ or donations to health care providers as corruption
can vary greatly between years and countries. In practice,
physicians continue to provide health care services and are
involved in routine exchanges of fees, gifts, and cash given
by patient. This type of exchange is often euphemistically
called ‘gift giving’. However, these payments have little in
commonwith real gifts.When anti-corruption legislation is
strictly enforced as well as the punishment of corruptive
actions is a real risk for parties involved, the connotation of
‘corruption’ shifts to socially undesirable behavior. As a
result, the borders between gifts and bribes become more
apparent and informal payments are likely to diminish.
When candid bribes are not prosecuted, general moral dis-
positions in society such as “everything that is not forbidden
is allowed”maywell predispose wide-spread cash informal
payments and corruption in the health care sector.
However, the important issue is the dimension of the
(non)conditioned provision of health care services. The
physician may be reluctant to provide detailed information
about the diagnosis and treatment, or may avoid referring
the patient to the most suitable specialist, or even ignore
the patient if no informal payment is offered (Allin, Davaki,
& Mossialos, 2006; Cohen, 2012; Ensor & Witter, 2001;
Gaal et al., 2006; Lewis, 2002, 2007; Pavlova et al., 2010).
Consequently, informal payments may affect the physi-
cian's decision on what services to provide and to whom to
provide them. Parallel to the informal payment however,
physicians or health care facilities also receive a formal
reimbursement (public funds) for services provided. Thus,
although at ﬁrst sight both providers and informal payers
beneﬁt from the informal exchange, the allocation of public
resources is also affected by the individual's willingness to
pay informally, not just the social value of the use of these
resources. In view of this, informal payments are seen as
providing incentives to physicians. If there are patients
willing to receive andwilling to pay informally for less cost-
effective services, then the cost-effectiveness of health care
service provision is also undermined. In view of this,
informal patient payments can become a major impedi-
ment for health care delivery and reforms that aim at the
efﬁcient use of public health care resources.
Although informal payments may help individual pa-
tients to obtain services with better quality (Mæstad &
Mwisongo, 2011; Thompson & Xavier, 2004), there is no
evidence that these payments signiﬁcantly contribute to
the improvement of clinical quality in the health care sector
in general (Gaal & McKee, 2005). Empirically tested (e.g.
quasi-experimental) ﬁndings that support or refute the
impact of informal payments on the attributes of services
provided (including quality attributes) are lacking. It is
recognized that health care providers are not interested inreinvesting the informal payments in the public health care
system (e.g. purchasing new medical equipment) but are
more likely to invest them in their own private practice or
use them to supplement their income (Belli et al., 2004;
Gaal et al., 2006; Kornai, 2000; Mæstad & Mwisongo,
2011). In the long-run, this may lead to better quality of
services provided in the private sector (for those who can
afford to pay the fees) than in the public sector, even if
provided by the same physician. The most negative effects
of informal patient payments are noted when patients who
lack funds or social protections, and cannot afford to pay
informally, either avoid or delay seeking treatment (Lewis,
2007). Frequently, they use personal savings, take out loans
and sell assets to cover these payments. The ultimate effect
is the same as referring patients to the private health care
sector. In some instances, low-income patients are found to
pay informally proportionally more in relation to their in-
come than high-income groups. In fact, informal patient
payments are highly regressive even when compared to
formal co-payments (Baji, Pavlova, Gulacsi, & Groot, 2012;
Mastilica & Bozikov, 1999; €Ozgen, Sahin, Belli, Tatar, &
Berman, 2010). The idea that physicians (guided by a
“Robin Hood” principle) charge rich patients informally and
provide free-of-charge service to poor patients (Morris &
Polese, 2014; Stan, 2012) is not supported by empirical
quantitative ﬁndings (Szende & Culyer, 2006).
Therefore, a variety of interrelated factors which are
associated with informal payments are tackled by different
authors (Gaal & McKee, 2005; Thompson & Witter, 2000;
Tomini & Maarse, 2011) who argue that the presence of
informal patient payments can be explained by the tradi-
tion of giving gifts as mentioned above, as well as by other
cultural, social and ethical factors that do not directly affect
the health care system. Overall, four basic dimensions are
noted in the literature (Gaal & McKee, 2005; Mossialos
et al., 2002; Tambor, Pavlova, Woch, & Groot, 2011;
Tomini, Groot, & Pavlova, 2012) e socio-cultural factors,
economic and labor factors, political and regulatory factors,
and health care systems in particular e that can be used to
classify the factors and shed a light on the causes of
informal payments. It should be pointed out however that
the dimensions (factors) are rather interwoven leading
jointly to the existence of a speciﬁc pattern of informal
payments in a country. For example, the existence of
informal payments is associated with insufﬁcient health
care system funding and low physicians' salaries (health
care system dimension). This offers an explanation of why
health care providers request informal payments and em-
phasizes the providers' role in the informal payment chain.
Nevertheless, insufﬁcient health care sector funding is
largely a result of poor economic circumstances (economic
and labor dimension), which in turn limit the resources
available for public health care provision. Thus, the two
dimensions, the health care sector and the economic and
labor environment, are interrelated and it might be difﬁcult
to distinguish their intertwined inﬂuence in practice.
Similarly, the socio-cultural factors indicate the role of
society but also the role of the patient as a key element of
the informal payment chain (health care system dimen-
sion). Thus, even when the informal payment is requested,
the patient makes the ﬁnal decision to resort to an informal
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patient is able to pour oil in the ﬂame of the defective
regulatory mechanisms and the economic climate that
leads to informal payments. But it is also the patient who
initiates informal payments as a means to obtain the
desired services. Cohen (2012) describes this behavior as a
“do-it-yourself” approach e an adaptive strategy of an in-
dividual who is unsatisﬁed with government services and
is willing to apply different (e.g. informal or “extra-legal”)
approaches to fulﬁll health care needs. Therefore, theoret-
ical discussions (Gaal & McKee, 2004) and empirically
tested theories (Burak & Vian, 2007) offer a deeper look at
individual motives for informal payments.
The culture of giving gifts seems to be the most
straightforward explanation that applies beyond the bor-
ders of a single country. However, in the context of inade-
quately funded public health care services, informal
payments also provide a means for patients in post-
communist and post-Soviet European countries to receive
services with quicker access and better quality, as well as to
health care providers to obtain adequate reimbursement
for services provided (Belli, 2002; Chawla, Berman, &
Kawiorska, 1998; Cockcroft et al., 2008; Tatar, €Ozgen,
Sahin, Belli, & Berman, 2007).
Given the above, a better understanding of the country-
speciﬁc context is essential for a full picture of informal
patient payments.
3. Health care systems and the socio-political context
of post-Soviet and post-communist European
countries
The transition from a state-planned to a market econ-
omy has created a mix of contrasting political and social
values, and a continuously changing socio-economic envi-
ronment in post-communist countries (Deppe& Oreskovic,
1996). There are also other disadvantageous trends (poor
health indicators, unemployment, low salaries of medical
staff, lack of trust). The cases used in this analysis e
Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland e have a lot in common,
though they also show some diversity in terms of economic
development, demographic patterns, and health indicators
and also, the extent of the problematic areas differs be-
tween the countries. The characteristic features of these
three countries are brieﬂy described in this section.
The economic development of the countries is tightly
related to the ﬁscal revenues allocated to the “non-proﬁt”
sectors. Insufﬁcient resources are often attributed to the
incapability of the government to ensure an adequate level
of public services provision. Indeed, two decades ago,
virtually all post-communist European countries experi-
enced an economic recession and difﬁculties in revenue
collection also in the health care sector. Later, the majority
of the countries in the region experienced economic
growth, especially those who joined the EU (e.g. Lithuania
and Poland) but not the countries from the Community of
Independent States (e.g. Ukraine) due to the slow privati-
zation process, the widespread corruption and the distance
from European markets.
Generally, a shortage of resources as well as a lack of
good governance is characteristic of all post-Sovietcountries (Gaal, 2004; Kuszewski & Gericke, 2005; Lekhan,
Rudiy,& Richardson, 2010). Less developed countries spend
less on health care per capita and rely on public funds,
whose share varies widely (from 40 to 85%) (WHO, 2013).
As presented in Table 1, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine
spend a similar share of GDP on health care (about 7e8%).
However, the expenditures on health care per capita differ:
US$730, 804 and 180 respectively, as well as the govern-
ment expenditure on health care per capita: US$ 499, 548
and 98 respectively.
The availability of resources matters, but also its man-
agement. The quality of governance can be measured by
such indicators as the rule of law, government effective-
ness, political stability and others. By and large, the scores
of Poland and Lithuania are higher than the Ukrainian;
however they are lower than the scores of Western Euro-
pean countries (The Worldwide Governance Indicators,
2010).
Considering the experience of the post-communist
countries, Poland has one of the best governance in-
dicators in the region (The Worldwide Governance
Indicators, 2010), presenting a case of a “season of cor-
ruption” in contrast to the deep-rooted “climate of cor-
ruption” in other post-communist countries (Miller,
Grødeland, & Koshechkina, 2001). Poland provides an
example of the implementation of anti-corruption mea-
sures (realized in cooperation between related sectors)
(Golinowska, 2010). Only after such institutional anti-
corruption measures are put in place with a special focus
on informal patient payments, have mass-media been
engaged in Poland. Possibly, anti-communist public moods,
a lack of nostalgia as well as the intention to join the EU
facilitated the reforms in virtually all sectors (Leven, 2005).
Thus, quality of governance is crucial to diminish the extent
of informal patient payments and of the informal sector in
general.
The capacity of the government has been also reﬂected
in the depth of the health care reforms in the countries.
More than one decade ago, almost all Eastern European
countries, including Lithuania and Poland but not Ukraine,
switched from a system of central planning and free-of-
charge health care to a decentralized system with a
health insurance fund. While Ukraine largely preserved the
tax-based health care system established during commu-
nism, Lithuania and Poland already established a social
health insurance system in the 1990s. In Lithuania, access
to health care is assured for the vast majority of residents
while the working population is obliged to join the state
health insurance scheme and the state increasingly con-
tributes for non-economically active inhabitants presenting
over 60 percent of the total population (Murauskiene,
Janoniene, Veniute, van Ginneken, & Karanikolos, 2013).
In Poland, social health insurance covers about 98% of the
population with a comprehensive beneﬁt package
(Golinowska & Tambor, 2012; Sagan et al., 2011).
Also, Lithuania and Poland have achieved more in the
ﬁeld of reducing hospital capacity and extending primary
health care (GPs play a gate-keeping role and are paid per
capita), as well as in improving quality and equity in health
care provision and the cost-effectiveness of health care
provision (Murauskiene et al., 2013; Sagan et al., 2011).
Table 1
Information about the countries included in the study.
Lithuania Poland Ukraine
General information
Population (million) 3.5 38.5 48.5
Territory (km2) 65 200 312 679 603 700
Gini index 36 31 31
Economic and labor factors
GDP (PPP per capita; US, billion) 12 323 13 334 6656
Black market [US, billion]a 0.044 0.919 4.310
Minimum wage deﬁned by the government [euro]b 232 340 89
Political and regulatory factors
Political stability,c rank 69 84 42
Government effectiveness,c rank 74 73 25
Rule of law,c rank 72 69 25
Control of corruption,c rank 66 70 17
Socio-cultural factors
The 2010 corruption perception index,d rank 46 41 134
Survival-self-expression valuese 1.00 0.14 1.72
Human development index,f rank 40 39 76
Health care system factors
Total expenditure on health [% GDP]g 7.8% 7.1% 7.0%




health [per capita, US$]g
499 548 98
Maternal mortality [death
per 100 000 live birth]g
8 5 32
Physicians destiny [physicians
per 10 000 population]g
3.61 2.16 3.25
Social health insuranceh [year of introduction] 1992 1999 Semashko system
Patient cost-sharing for health care servicesi Fees for GPs' home visits,
specialist without referral,
and some diagnostics
No fees for services used,
discussion only
Free-of-chare is guaranteed
by the Constitution. except for
some luxury servicesj
a Black Market Products Index. Havocscope. Retrieved from: http://www.havocscope.com/country-proﬁle/.
b Federation of European employers: http://www.fedee.com/minwage.html.
c The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2010: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
d Transparency international. Corruption perception index 2010.
e World Values Surveys: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
f UNDP, Human development index.
g Global Health Observatory Data Repository, World health organization: http://apps.who.int/ghodata/.
h Kutzin et al. (2010).
i Tambor et al. (2011).
j Lekhan et al. (2010).
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are considered to be unclear in Ukraine where the Consti-
tution guarantees free-of-charge health care services and a
list of luxury “paid services” has been introduced. In
Lithuania, payment regulations seem to be more grounded.
Lithuanians who are non-residents, non-insured, non-
registered by GP are charged for using non-vital health
care services (Murauskiene, Pavlova, Veniute, & Groot,
2012; Murauskiene, Veniute, & Pavlova, 2010). In addi-
tion, a price-list has been developed in case of consumption
of services from the negative list of (mostly auxiliary) ser-
vices. Quasi-formal payments and informal patient pay-
ment are considered to be widespread but they are not
subject of consistent policy debates and are not always
recognized by policy-makers as essentially problematic.
Recently, the Lithuanian government has attempted to
regulate the quasi-formal payments that had been intro-
duced by public health care facilities. Meanwhile, in Poland,discussions on the possible introduction of patient pay-
ments have taken place, which has not resulted in new
policies (Tambor et al., 2011).
It is important to underline the features of the socio-
political environment of Lithuania and Poland (additional
to those presented in Table 1), which joined the EU in 2004.
EU membership provided a framework and stimulus to
improve regulations, to achieve better living standards,
more transparency and accountability. It also required the
eradication of corruption. Meanwhile, Ukraine is a non-EU
member and until recently had doubtful chances to achieve
this membership.
The countries experienced numerous appointments of
ministers of health during the last decade (e.g. 8 in
Lithuania, 10 in Ukraine and 13 in Poland with an average
length of stay of 1e1.5 year). The general political and social
situation has also not been very stable in the countries
during the past years. Wanner's suggestion that the
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the Baltic or other former-socialist Eastern European
countries” (2006: 517), is also conﬁrmed by the EU-
membership of Lithuania and Poland in contrast to
Ukraine. However, in these countries, political and eco-
nomic changes have also entailed new combinations of
individual-social interests (more orientated to individual
ones) as well as new consumer values. However, during
transition, post-Soviet societies lost trust in authorities due
to the loss of principles of social welfare (Dobryninas, 2005;
Polese, 2008; Polese et al., 2014; Wanner, 2006). In
particular, the overall situation in Ukraine before the rev-
olution in 2014 was characterized by a monopolization of
political and economic power by political forces for self-
enrichment as well as by the lack of public trust in state
institutions coupled with non-fulﬁllment of political and
economic obligations (Kuzio, 2012). At the same time,
Lithuania endures a demographic crisis, i.e. negative pop-
ulation increase and one of the highest emigration rates in
Europe.
Summarizing, the environment in Ukraine is relatively
more conductive to informal payments compared to that in
Lithuania and especially in Poland with regard to differ-
ences in economic, regulatory and health care system, and
perhaps to a lesser extent differences in the cultural envi-
ronment in the countries.
4. Methods
In July 2010, nationally representative identical house-
hold surveys were conducted in Lithuania, Poland and
Ukraine. 1000 completed interviews were collected in each
country. A stratiﬁed random sample was drawn in three
countries following a multi-staged random probability
method. Firstly, the sampling points in each country (ca.
150 sampling points per country) were distributed pro-
portionally to regional, urban/rural and ethnic character-
istics of the population. Secondly, 8e10 addresses/
households per sampling point and thirdly, one adult
member (older than 18 years) per household were selected
for interview. If the respondent determined on stage 3
refused or was unavailable to take part in an interview after
two call backs, a replacing respondent was identiﬁed
following stage 2e3.
The mode of data collection was face-to-face interviews
based on a standardized questionnaire. The research in-
strument was developed in English and then translated.
The translation was veriﬁed using the method of backward
translation by an independent translation agency to check
preservation of meaning. The questionnaire was kept
identical for countries to ensure a meaningful comparison
of the results between the countries. Prior to the survey, the
interviewers were trained to clarify the ﬁeldwork stan-
dards and the speciﬁcities of the questionnaire. A high
number of interviewers were involved in the surveys to
avoid interviewer bias.
All respondents were asked about their attitude toward
informal cash payment and gifts in kind and whether they
associate cash or in-kind gifts with corruption. In these
questions, cash payments and in-kind gifts were separated
since the perception of gifts was expected to be dissimilarto that of cash payments. Respondents could agree or
disagree with the statements about the inevitability of
informal payments because of low health care funding and
about the need of eradicating informal patient payments.
Additionally, interviewees were also asked to conﬁrm,
deny, or express ambiguity about ﬁve perception state-
ments that indicate individual acceptance or readiness to
pay informally for health care (e.g. being unable to refuse to
pay informally if asked). Also, we asked respondents about
their past experience with informal payments and related
total expenditures as well as informal part of it (the overall
monetary estimation of the gifts in kind and cash given for
the service). In this question, public and private services are
not divided to account for differences in the system of
health care service provision. Except for the above-
mentioned questions on informal patient payments
analyzed here, the questionnaire included other parts
focused on preferences for health care services and also a
socio-demographic section. On average each interview
lasted 30 min.
5. The patterns and attitudes towards informal
payments in Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine
Data on the scope and level of informal patient pay-
ments in post-Soviet Lithuania and Ukraine, and post-
communist Poland suggest widespread informal practices
in health care provision in Ukraine, to a lesser extent in
Lithuania and much lesser extent in Poland. In particular,
there is a variety of differences in the organization and
ﬁnancing health care service provision as well as a mixture
of patient payment policies in the countries that accom-
pany informal payments.5.1. The scope and level of informal patient payments
Table 2 shows the valid percentage of respondents and
the number of those who report that they have ever paid
informally in cash or in the form of in-kind gifts. In
Lithuania and Ukraine, the percentage of those who have
ever given cash tomedical staff is almost the same (48% and
53% respectively) in contrast to 17% reported by Polish re-
spondents. A higher percentage of respondents report that
they have ever made informal payments to medical staff in
the form of in kind gifts compared to cash payments.
Moreover, each third respondent in the Ukrainian sample
in contrast to each eight respondent in the Lithuanian and
Polish samples has ever been asked to pay informally for
health care services. Similar results are reported in
Lithuania and Poland in a recent study (Study on
Corruption in the Healthcare Sector, 2013). Generally,
informal payments are more widespread when they are
solicited or expected by providers, and also higher amounts
of informal payments are given at the medical staff's
request as suggested by previous studies (e.g. Tomini et al.,
2012). According to Cohen (2012), solicited informal pay-
ments can be seen as an indicator of major ﬁnancial trou-
bles in the health care system, while patient-initiated
informal payments can be related to unmet patients' ex-
pectations of better service quality.
Table 2
Health care services consumption and payments during the last 12 months.a
Lithuania Poland Ukraine
Ever
Have you ever personally paid informally in
cash to physicians, medical staff or other
personnel in health care facilities?
No N (%) 525 (52.0) 801 (82.7) 467 (47.0)
Yes N (%) 484 (48.0) 167 (17.3) 527 (53.0)
Have you ever personally given any gift in
kind to physicians, medical staff or other
personnel in health care facilities?
No N (%) 472 (46.7) 627 (64.9) 417 (42.0)
Yes N (%) 539 (53.3) 339 (35.1) 576 (58.0)
Number of respondents who have been ever
personally asked to pay informally
No N (%) 887 (87.9) 843 (86.6) 689 (69.5)
Yes N (%) 122 (12.1) 130 (13.4) 303 (30.5)
Last year
Use of out-patient (physician) services
during the last 12 months
No N (%) 272 (26.9) 207 (20.0) 426 (42.7)
Yes N (%) 739 (73.1) 792 (80.0) 572 (57.3)
Number of visits Median 3.00 3.00 2.00
Mean (SD) 5.02 (5.32) 5.14 (4.89) 3.45 (4.25)
Payments for out-patient (physician)
services by users
No N (%) 414 (56.7) 551 (76.3) 246 (43.3)
Yes N (%) 316 (43.3) 171 (23.7) 322 (56.7)
Total payments Median 28.9 49.4 19.2
Mean (SD) 85.4 (159.3) 82.0 (90.0) 60.8 (123.5)
Informal payments for out-patient
(physician) services by users
No N (%) 584 (80.0) 676 (93.2) 358 (63.4)
Yes N (%) 146 (20.0) 49 (6.8) 207 (36.6)
Total informal payments Median 28.9 24.7 9.6
Mean (SD) 80.5 (161.3) 69.6 (83.5) 32.2 (62.4)
Knowledge of the ofﬁcial fees for
physician's services
Never N (%) 519 (55.2) 395 (41.0) 540 (54.0)
Somewhat N (%) 264 (28.1) 348 (34.8) 361 (36.1)
Always N (%) 158 (16.8) 220 (22.8) 99 (9.9)
Use of in-patient (hospital) services during
the last 12 months
No N (%) 846 (83.7) 841 (84.1) 816 (81.6)
Yes N (%) 165 (16.3) 159 (15.9) 184 (18.4)
Number of hospitalizations Median 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean (SD) 1.52 (1.10) 1.60 (1.45) 1.48 (0.81)
Payments for in-patient (hospital)
services by users
No N (%) 65 (39.4) 114 (53.0) 48 (27.0)
Yes N (%) 100 (60.6) 101 (47.0) 130 (73.0)
Total payments Median 86.9 49.4 95.9
Mean (SD) 149.7 (160.1) 97.0 (89.5) 195.9 (235.2)
Informal payments for in-patient (hospital)
services by users
No N (%) 79 (49.1) 130 (83.3) 87 (49.4)
Yes N (%) 82 (50.9) 26 (16.7) 89 (50.6)
Total informal payments Median 130.3 49.4 38.3
Mean (SD) 143.9 (129.2) 61.2 (54.4) 81.2 (121.1)
Knowledge of the ofﬁcial fees for hospital services Never N (%) 601 (65.0) 517 (54.7) 553 (55.3)
Somewhat N (%) 210 (22.7) 255 (27.0) 323 (32.3)
Always N (%) 114 (12.3) 174 (18.4) 124 (12.4)
a All amounts in the table are presented in Euro. Firstly, in local currency for 2011 and 2009 amounts are converted to 2010 values based on Consumer
Price Index per country (source: World Bank), then converted from local currency to Euro based on average conversion rate for 2010 (source: ESB).
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informal payment is to a great extent determined by the
type of service consumed (out-patient or in-patient care).
The results presented in Table 2 suggest a higher number of
users and amounts that are paid for hospitalizations. The
literature also provides evidence on more expensive pay-
ments paid by a higher share of patients during a hospi-
talization (Kornai, 2000; Shahriari, Belli, & Lewis, 2001;
Szende & Culyer, 2006; Tomini & Maarse, 2011; Vian,
Grybosk, Sinoimeri, & Hall, 2006). In detail, when the
annual proportion of informal payers is examined it ap-
pears that about 7% of Poles, 20% of Lithuanian and 37% of
Ukrainian out-patients, and about half of the in-patients in
Lithuania and Ukraine in contrast to 17% in Poland, pay
informally. Ukrainians report a median value of about 15
Euro in informal payments per respondent per year while
this is about 44 Euro in Lithuania and Poland. When the
means of the informal patient payments per respondent
per year are compared with the minimum wage in the
countries (see Eurostat, 2010), it appears to be virtuallyequal to one monthly minimumwage in Ukraine, to half of
it in Lithuania and to quarter in Poland. Taking into account
the share of those who are unable to pay (Tambor et al.,
2014), this indicates a considerable burden on households
caused by informal patient payments (especially for lower-
income households and especially in Ukraine).
It is worth mentioning that informal patient payments
can co-exist with other types of patient payments such as
quasi-formal and ofﬁcial patient payments. When a clear
regulation of the basic package and formal patient charges
is lacking, patients experience a mixture of payment obli-
gations. For example, we observe that informal payments
are a wide-spread supplement to also widespread quasi-
formal payments in Lithuania and Ukraine. Meanwhile,
patients in these two post-Soviet countries are poorly
informed about the size of the formal fees as indicated in
Table 2. Therefore, similar practices of informal payments
constitute a behavioral pattern in health care consumption.
Perhaps, a common social past provides a lot of similarities
however more modest nature of the phenomenon in
Table 3
Public attitudes and perceptions towards informal patient payments.
Sample size Lithuania Poland Ukraine
N ¼ 1012 N ¼ 1000 N ¼ 1000
Valid % Valid % Valid %
What is your attitude towards informal cash payments to physicians,
medical staff or other personnel in health care facilities?
Negative 72.2 78.3 74.9
Indifferent 11.3 20.3 13.2
Positive 16.5 1.4 11.9
What is your attitude towards giving gifts in kind to physicians,
medical staff or other personnel in health care facilities?
Negative 44.7 60.5 51.6
Indifferent 12.3 30.6 19.1
Positive 43.0 9.0 29.3
Informal cash payments to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption No 10.6 3.5 12.2
Somewhat 19.3 14.1 29.9
Yes 70.2 82.3 57.8
Gifts in kind to physicians and medical staff are similar to corruption No 33.3 19.9 37.3
Somewhat 28.6 26.9 32.5
Yes 38.1 53.2 30.2
Informal cash payments to physicians and medical staff are an expression of gratitude. No 45.4 58.8 34.2
Somewhat 34.4 27.9 41.4
Yes 20.2 13.3 24.4
Gifts in kind to physicians and medical staff are an expression of gratitude No 18.5 27.9 17.2
Somewhat 35.2 39.9 40.4
Yes 46.4 32.2 42.4
Informal cash payments and gifts in kind to physicians and medical staff
are inevitable because of the low funding of the health care sector
No 47.7 57.6 25.9
Somewhat 27.5 28.7 29.9
Yes 24.8 13.7 44.2
Cash or gifts in kind, given informally to physicians and medical staff, should be eradicated. No 8.4 4.8 7.6
Somewhat 18.6 18.4 26.6
Yes 73.1 76.7 65.8
Would refuse to pay informally if asked to make such payments No 28.0 14.7 41.1
Yes 35.1 57.8 26.6
Uncertain 37.0 27.5 32.2
Prefers to use private health care because of the informal payments No 24.1 21.3 32.7
Yes 51.9 50.4 34.0
Uncertain 26.7 28.3 33.3
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development and governance practice.
5.2. Attitudes towards informal patient payments:
quantitative evidence
Public opinion, though infrequently considered in policy
making, can play an essential role in dealing with informal
payments (Ensor, 2004). Culture, social norms and histor-
ical developments in a country inﬂuence individual atti-
tudes and behavior (Gatti, Paternostro, & Rigolini, 2003).
Public acceptance enables the existence of payments and
may hinder elimination. Moreover, public opinion towards
a social phenomenon (such as informal payments for
health care) may affect behavior of individual patients and
providers, and thus, the speciﬁc patienteprovider relation
where informal payments originate from.
Therefore, recent data on public attitudes and opinions
are highly important. Table 3 shows the valid percentage of
respondents per country, who stated their perceptions and
attitudes toward informal patient payments. Generally, the
attitude towards informal cash payments and to a lesser
extent towards in-kind gifts is overall negative among the
public in Lithuania and Ukraine and even more in Poland.
The attitudes towards cash informal patient payments are
rather negative (72% in Lithuania, 75% in Ukraine and 78%
in Poland) whereas a relatively lower percentage of people
in Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland (45%, 52% and 61%respectively) report negative attitudes and are not afraid to
voice a positive attitude towards in-kind gifts.
Previous studies have also reported on the prevalence of
negative attitudes towards informal payments as well as a
more positive attitude to in-kind gifts compared to cash
payments (Balabanova & McKee, 2002; Belli et al., 2004;
Cockcroft et al., 2008; Tatar et al., 2007). Although in-kind
gifts (as well as cash payments) can be considered as a
means to obtain better and quicker services when the
system fails to offer adequate service standards to all pa-
tients, in-kind gifts are not supposed to induce expendi-
tures beyond the patient's means. Tokens of gratitude are
common practice all over the world but the extent of the
gift-giving practice might differ (Abbasi & Gadit, 2008;
Spence, 2005) as in some countries clear regulations of
physician behavior are more developed and adhered to
(Gaufberg, 2007; Kutzin, Cashin, & Jakab, 2010; Rechel,
Blackburn, Spencer, & Rechel, 2011). Moreover, when gifts
are not expected and encouraged, they do not adversely
affect efﬁciency in health care provision (Gaal & McKee,
2005).
Another dimension of consumers' acceptance of
informal transaction is to label it as “corruption” or “gra-
tuity”. As is shown in Table 3, there is widespread adher-
ence to the notion that informal cash payments are similar
to corruption and that in-kind gifts are an expression of
gratitude. Still, diversity of opinions is observed in mid-
points, for example, about 20e24% of the public in both
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informal cash payment can be seen as gratitude. Also, 30%
of respondents in Ukraine, 38% in Lithuania and higher
portion in Poland (53%) think that in-kind gifts given to
medical staff can be treated as corruption.
As public attitude can typically be seen as public moods
translated via media, it is also important to have a deeper
look at individual consumers' perceptions. Speciﬁcally,
disposition (attitudes coupled with previous experience) is
a personal construction that ensures speciﬁc behavior to
occur in a given situation and is seen as a regulatory
mechanism of human behavior (Uznadze, 1966). However,
it is difﬁcult to measure, especially in cases of informal
patient payments. Therefore, we attempt to examine
perceived behavioral statements related to informal pay-
ments (that indicate personal disposition towards these
payments). As a result, we observe that those who feel
uncomfortable without giving a gratitude payment and
who feel unable to refuse to pay informally if asked, more
often report making informal payments than the rest of the
respondents.
As it is shown in Table 3, 33% of Ukrainians and 21e24%
of Poles and Lithuanians have chosen the “no” answer on
preferences for paying ofﬁcially in the private health care
sector instead of making informal payments in the public
one. Also, on the question “would you refuse to pay infor-
mally if asked to make such payments” fewer Lithuanians
and even fewer Poles answer negatively in contrast to
Ukrainians when asked (28% and 15% in contrast to 41%
respectively). Perhaps differences in patterns of patiente
physician communication with more empowered Lithua-
nian and Polish patients may explain the diversity in the
scores as well as consequences of such refusal. Overall, the
obedience to the requests of medical staff to pay informally
can be conditioned by patients' expectations for better
treatment or by a fear that treatment can be denied (Belli
et al., 2004; Lekhan, Rudiy, & Shishkin, 2007). The latter
is explained by the market power of health care providers
as well as by external pressure (Jancsics, 2015), e.g. by low-
paid medical staff, who in the absence of free patient
choice, bring informal practices to the patientephysician
relation (Aarva, Ilchenko, Gorobets, & Rogacheva, 2009;
Miller, 2006). This also may indicate variations in cultural
context in these countries. Still, as data are lacking, it is
difﬁcult to track the changes of consumers' dispositionwith
regard to economic, legislative and health care sector
development.
5.3. Opinions on the eradication of informal patient payments
The key challenges in the eradication of informal pay-
ments become more visible when the scope of and atti-
tudes towards informal payments are considered in the
light of economics and governance. In Lithuania, Poland
and even more in Ukraine, it is possible that the public is
willing to change their pattern of behavior but poor
governance, economic development and low health care
funding leave much to be desired.
A key function of informal payment in services provi-
sion is seen in supplementing inadequate health care
funding (Lewis, 2007). Indeed, in Lithuania, Poland and inUkraine, per capita government expenditures on health
care is even lower than in other countries in the region
where informal payments are negligible, namely the Czech
Republic and Slovenia (Leive, 2010; WHO, 2010). In addi-
tion, our survey results indicate that about 14% of Polish
and 25% of Lithuanian respondents consider informal
payments for health care to be inevitable because of the
low health care funding whereas this percentage is even
higher for Ukraine (44%). Furthermore, the Lithuanian,
Polish and Ukrainian public support the statement that
informal patient payments should be eradicated; only
about 5e8% are sure that this is not necessary.
Low funding of the public sector affects preeminently
public service providers' ofﬁcial salaries. Since the 1950s,
the communist ideology promoted community interests
rather than individual enrichment (Gaal & McKee, 2005).
Thus low wages of physicians were politically stipulated.
However, after the Soviet Union the tradition of low-paid
health care staff has not changed, leading to a popular
‘poorly-paid doctors’ excuse for resorting to informal pay-
ments. Granovetter (2007, p. 155) suggests that “employers
knowingly pay lower wages than they or the employee
think reasonable, assuming that some pilferage will take
place that makes up the difference”. Moreover, in some
instances, physicians are found to earn as much as a full
additional salary from informal payments (Baji, Pavlova,
Gulacsi, & Groot, 2011; Betliy, Kuziakiv, & Onishchenko,
2007; Ensor & Savelyeva, 1998; Falkingham, 2004; Kornai,
2000). Still, certain specialties like surgery, gynecology
and dentistry allow earning higher informal remunerations
compared to others leading to an unequal distribution of
income and therefore, creating inadequate work conditions
for unattractive specialties.
6. Conclusions
The empirical results show that informal payments are
often used in health care services. Patients resort to making
informal payments, but at the same time public opinion on
informal payments for health care is negative. The problem
of informal payment is complex and relates to the imbal-
ance between actual provision and services expected.
Therefore, the dominant ‘culture’ of gift-giving or dona-
tions in health care can be seen not as a voluntary practice
but rather as forced actions in terms of the failure of social
welfare provision (Davies & Polese, 2015). Also, important
details of the organization and ﬁnancing of health care
service delivery may contribute to our understanding
which features of health care system force patients to
speciﬁc actions that consequently form a unique pattern of
informal patient payments in the country.
The low level of salary of health care personnel is typi-
cally considered as the most important factor that explains
the spread of informal patient payments (Belli, 2001; Healy
& McKee, 1997; Rechel & McKee, 2009; Van Lerberghe,
Conceiç~ao, Van Damme, & Ferrinho, 2002). Lower physi-
cians' salaries compared to the country average or to the
industrial sector average provide a motive for patients and
physicians to go into informal payment arrangements. A
quotation of Mauro (1997) presented by Shahriari et al.
(2001) underlines a basic principle of underpaid public
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service pay is too low, civil servants may be obliged to use
their positions to collect bribes as a way to make ends
meet.” However, the increase of health care staff remu-
neration will not be a panacea for the problem of informal
patient payments. For example, in Lithuania health care
providers' salaries were increased in 2005e2008 but
informal patient payments still prevail (Murauskiene et al.,
2013). Except for the level of salary in the health care sector,
a performance-based provider payment mechanism may
play an important role in stimulating the provision of suf-
ﬁcient quality and quantity of services. Similar to Western
European countries, some post-communist countries have
introduced per capita payment systems for GPs (e.g. Poland
and Lithuania as it is mentioned above). In Ukraine, the
newly established practice of family doctors involves this
practice but is limited to a number of pilot regions. Chawla,
Tomasik, Kulis, Windak, and Rogers (1999) indicates that
only the capitated primary care physicians did not charge
additionally, namely, those physicians whose earnings
were highest due to the adequacy of the per capita pay-
ment and the patterns of demand. However, in-patient
personnel are usually paid salaries (Groenewegen, Dixon,
& Boerma, 2002; Kutzin et al., 2010).
Still, political and economic changes in the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (especially those related to public services
provision, given its degree of accountability and trans-
parency) are seen as key determinants to informal ex-
changes ﬂourishing. Informal payments serve as a means
for individuals to achieve at least a higher individual wel-
fare when the state fails to ensure social welfare (Wanner,
2006). Consequently, underpaid health care staff is one of
the many other failures of government policy. Particularly,
when quality standards (protocols) are absent or when
their application is not monitored, in a context of under-
funding, providers themselves may choose the attributes of
the service to be offered to the patient. Thus, in order to
have control over the quality of care, patients resort to
informal payments which are perceived as a tool of control
(Stan, 2012). However, patients are not able to recognize
divergences in terms of clinical quality unlike service
wrapping. Furthermore, in the context of service quality
ambiguity, erosion of trust erodes the patienteprovider
relation, which has consequences for treatment outcomes
as well. A similar effect is observed in case of a negative
attitude of medical staff to patients. Taking into account the
market power of health care providers as well as the issue
of information asymmetry, patients appear in a vulnerable
position that has also been suggested by our empirical re-
sults on consumers' perceptions.
Also, outdated equipment and improper state of facilities
become barriers for adequate service quality. The lack of
suitable investments is seen as a direct result of under-
funding but also of an inefﬁcient management of health care
resources. Informal patient payments as well as quasi-
formal payment may well ﬁll gaps in funding of health
care facilities (Gaal et al., 2010; Lewis, 2000). A recent study
on how resources of health care facilities are managed in
Ukraine provides evidence that informal payments given by
patients to medical doctors can be re-invested in practice
and in facility maintenance: individual health care providersbuy bulbs, detergents as well as pay for their professional
growth, including trainings, etc (World Bank, 2014).
Informal payments (e.g. for health care services) are
more deeply rooted in the countries where the government
tolerates and relies on informal payments since these
payments are an additional source of funding. Therefore,
informal payments e which have existed for decades as an
acceptable practice e shift from deviant behavior to a
normative one bringing a mismatch in the health care
sector goals and in the measures applied to achieve the
goals. The privatization of health care takes place de facto.
At the same time, the public seems to be unsatisﬁed with
how public services are provided. Although the presence of
a civil society is a political regime attribute, public interests
can be represented via a civil society that can inﬂuence the
level of corruption (Grimes, 2008), or can play the role of
“anti-corruption watchdog” (Grødeland & Aasland, 2011).
Still, policy-making in most post-communist countries
(including post-soviet countries) frequently serves the in-
terests of top-business (e.g. Kuzio, 2012). The medical elite
is not interested in reforms aimed to harmonize respon-
sibly and redeem patients from ﬁnancial burden (Gaal &
McKee, 2005). The problem is not only in informal pay-
ments but also in the transformation of health care system
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